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ABSTRACT 
 
This research explores the institutionalisation of a new performance management system, namely the 
Balanced Scorecard in a Government owned corporation in Australia. A single exploratory/descriptive 
case study with embedded multiple unit analysis was used in order to examine the adoption of a balanced 
scorecard as an example of the process of evolution of a new initiative. It uses the concept of isomorphism 
to explain the initial adoption of the Balanced Scorecard. Further, it highlights the importance of the 
deliberation of both rational analytical approaches and legitimacy as a fundamental accompaniment to 
isomorphism in the continuing development of the new performance management system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditional accounting literature suggests that accounting systems should reflect and promote rationality 
in decision making. Dirsmith (1986, p. 357) argues that “management accounting is purportedly directed 
at serving as a quantitative expression of organisational goals used to support rational decision making 
processes”. Institutional sociological research emphasises the role of the external environment as a 
determinant of the organisation’s internal structures and systems. In this regard, the method of accounting 
adopted by an organisation reflects environmental pressures imposed instead of the organisation’s 
technical operations in a rational way (Meyer, 1986, p. 352). Jarvinen (2006) who studied the adoption of 
activity based costing in two Finnish hospitals, argues that the adoption was based on faith in the 
instittuionalised environment rather than as a technical rational decision.  The adoption per se` is a direct 
result of “assuming a compromise with rationality through the use of a legitimate form of language 
represented by accounting” (Nunez, 2002, p.280).  In this regard, a departure from technical rational 
behaviour may occur as the organisation strives for legitimacy through homogenisation with its 
institutionalised environment. 
The previous argument regarding institutional pressures establishes the basis for the analysis 
presented in this study: organisations will consider their external environment and attempt to model 
structures to appear legitimate. However, it is put forward that organisation’s will also adopt technical 
rational procedures, such as contemporary performance measurement systems, to enable them to be 
strategically placed in a competitive environment. 
Performance measures have been advocated as a central strategy for gaining greater control over 
public expenditure, increased value for money, accountability and as a means to demonstrate improved 
managerial competence in the public sector (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Both in the literature and 
practice of public sector reform, performance measures have gained the status of rationalised, 
institutionalised myths and are viewed as having a clear direction to better management and enhanced 
accountability (Hood, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
As in other parts of the world the principle being followed in the Australian public sector, is one 
of exposing large parts of the public sector to competition and market mechanisms. This has been 
facilitated by the implementation of a National Competition Policy (NCP), which has provided a vehicle 
with which to achieve the philosophies of the New Public Management (NPM). NPM is grounded in two 
fundamental philosophies: ‘managerialism’ and ‘economic rationalism’ (Parker and Guthrie, 1993). These 
philosophies promote the advocacy of formal rational management, an emphasis on the necessity for clear 
goals, corporate plans, and above all, internal and external accounting systems with clear responsibility 
lines for output performance measurement. The general theme of NCP reforms are to develop a domestic 
market for goods and services that is open and integrated by eliminating nonessential barriers to trade and 
competition, and diminishing complicated and duplicated procedures and administrative processes 
(Hughes, 1998; Queensland Treasury, 1996).  
Since the early 90s, Queensland, the north eastern State of Australia, has experienced a period of 
government committed to change and reform. New guidelines have been introduced in order to facilitate 
the introduction of the NCP and to provide a program of change to the management and structure of 
public business enterprises. As such, in 1993 the Queensland government passed the Government Owned 
Corporations Act so as to enhance the effectiveness of NCP. Corporatisation in the context of this Act, is 
seen as a structural reform process that changes the conditions under which Government owned 
corporations (GOCs) operate. They are placed as far as practicable on a commercial basis in a competitive 
environment, which allows the government, as owner, to continue to provide broad direction by setting 
key financial and non-financial performance targets and community service obligations. The objectives of 
corporatisation are to improve the State’s overall economic performance, and the ability of the 
government to achieve social objectives by improving the performance and effectiveness of corporatised 
government owned enterprises. As such, beyond facilitating processes for decision-making, 
corporatisation and the introduction of competition has the capacity to drastically alter performance 
measurement system (PMS) design (Shand, 1990). Hence the motivation for the study. 
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The recent developments in the public sector in Queensland, and especially in the electricity 
industry, offered a context for the study of the changing role and importance of accounting technologies in 
an institutional environment. The changes that are being proposed for the electricity industry in 
Queensland involved extensive organisational rearrangements. For example, since 1996 electricity boards 
have been legally required to operate as successful businesses in a newly created (pseudo) marketplace. 
The effectiveness of these rearrangements has required large-scale investment in new accounting and 
control systems. From a research point of view such a period of change provided an excellent opportunity 
for studying the development of new PMSs as an integral part of the management control system (MCS) 
in organisations.  
The primary objective of this paper is to put forward a framework grounded in new institutional 
sociology (NIS) theory that examines the impact of corporatisation and NCP on the design and 
implementation of a Balanced Scorecard (BSC), originally developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992), in a 
government owned electricity supply corporation in Australia1. A further objective of this study is to 
address some of the criticisms directed at the ability of NIS at informing organisational change by 
providing additional empirical support and by utilising this theory to explain organisational change at the 
micro level rather than only at the macro level. This study does this by examining the adoption of a BSC 
as an example of the process of evolution of a new initiative. It uses DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
concept of isomorphism to explain the initial adoption of the BSC. Further, it highlights the importance of 
the rational analytical deliberation of legitimacy as a fundamental accompaniment to isomorphism in the 
continuing development of the new PMS.  
This paper is organised as follows, first literature is reviewed that discusses the fundamental 
concepts of performance management and in doing so addresses the underlying notions of the BSC. The 
second part of the paper discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the study followed by the research 
method and brief introduction to the subject organisation. The findings of the study are structurally written 
to progressively unfold the events leading up to and including the implementation of the BSC. A 
discussion of the findings concludes this paper. 
 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Recently a variety of accounting procedures have been advanced to improve the way in which 
performance measures assist in the management of change. These procedures focus on linking business 
strategy with processes across operations and include the design of balanced scorecard models and 
performance measurement hierarchies (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 
Lynch and Cross, 1991; Nanni et al., 1992). While these goal matching procedures have been supported 
widely in the academic and professional literature, there is limited evidence on the nature of the processes 
within the public sector. 
Traditionally, performance measures in the public sector have been used to support the budget 
process (Lauth, 1985). Brennan and Dollery (1999) argue that little attention has been paid until recently, 
to evaluating the quality and standard of the services provided by the public sector. Most attention has 
been directed towards the cost factors associated with the delivery of services. The increase of total quality 
management initiatives (TQM) and focus on customer service in the public sector have drawn out the 
importance of providing high standard services to customers. Quality issues are seen as an important 
competitive arena, and failure to do well on the appropriate performance indicators is likely to have 
adverse effects on a government’s judgments about managerial effectiveness (Foster, 1992). This 
undertaking has been further complicated by the fact that in recent years many public services have come 
under pressure to become more economic, efficient and effective, so as to reduce their demands on 
constituents, while maintaining the quality of services supplied to the public. To accomplish this, GOCs 
have been subjected to the introduction of a variety of private sector management methods and systems 
and the frequent adoption of neo-market systems (Brignall and Modell, 2000 p. 286). As a result, 
according to Atkinson and McCrindell (1997), performance measures have become cumbersome and too 
operationally focused. The outcome being a diverse range of performance measures that are 
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overwhelming and do not always meet the needs of stakeholders. Public sector firms need a better means 
of determining performance in relation to objectives as well as accountability (Atkinson and McCrindell, 
1997). In light of this, many public sector organisations are now streamlining their PMSs and adopting 
contemporary performance measurement systems such as the BSC.  
The BSC performance measurement system includes a range of financial and non-financial 
performance indicators. Although in some public sector organisation’s, non-financial indicators have been 
used for many decades, particularly at the operational levels, they have not always been a part of the 
formal performance measurement system. Often, they have been introduced sporadically as a means of 
monitoring the more qualitative side of public sector management and effectiveness resulting in a 
multitude of mismatched measures often unrelated to organisational objectives. The measures 
incorporated within a BSC have a strategic orientation, that is, performance indicators that are selected to 
directly measure areas that provide competitive advantage and guide managers. The BSC performance 
measurement system often refers to external benchmarks which provide an indication as to whether 
performance is as good as that of competitors, or of other best practices companies. In conventional 
performance measurement systems it is common to compare actual performance with last year’s 
performance, or with budgeted targets that have been set within the organisation. The BSC performance 
measurement system often builds continuous improvement into performance targets and the way 
performance is measured.  A BSC can satisfy companies’ greater internal communication need as it 
facilitates decisions and actions that support strategies based on the needs of stakeholders, internal and 
external customers, regulatory bodies, managers and employees and requires involvement by all levels of 
the organisation (Kaplan and Norton, 1996).  
The upsurge of interest in contemporary performance measurement systems in the public sector 
has been dominated by efforts to design effective systems that emanate from the private sector.  These 
systems seemingly legitimising an organisation’s attempt at rational instrumentalisation of a PMS that 
would appear to follow the philosophies of NPM. From the point of view of successful PMS 
implementation, the most recent advances in the literature originating from private sector practices, have 
neglected the insights of institutional theory whereby comparatively little attention has been paid to the 
isomorphic processes by which such practices are implemented. The following section puts forward a 
theoretical framework that attempts to overcome this neglect. 
 
TOWARDS AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR BSC ADOPTION 
 
The focus which accounting control provides to organisational activities and processes plays an important 
role in influencing planning and decision-making (Libby and Waterhouse, 1996) hence, the debate on 
PMS development has largely been guided by a rationalistic perspective. Rational analytical approaches, 
such as budgeting and performance measurement, capitalise on the ability of organisations to deploy 
resources and manoeuvre in their environment in a manner that fosters better than chance results. Modell 
(2003) argues that whilst the NPM movement is itself rooted in a technically rational paradigm, an 
alternative perspective gaining ground in the public sector accounting literature is that informed by NIS 
(Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Scapens, 
1994; Scott 1995). New institutional sociology2 has contributed significantly to the understanding of the 
relationship between organisational structures and the wider social environment in which organisations are 
situated (Burns, 1996, 1997, 2000; Carruthers, 1995; Covaleski et al., 1993; Covaleski et al., 1996; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Mezias, 1990; Scapens, 1994). For these institutionalist's, the structure and 
behaviour of organisations is largely founded on taken-for-granted scripts of organisational reality and not 
on maximising strategies.  
The general theme of the NIS perspective is that an organisation’s continuing existence 
necessitates it to become isomorphic with, or rather, conform to social norms of acceptable organisational 
behaviour so as to demonstrate legitimacy. In this sense, to demonstrate legitimate behaviour that would 
suggest the organisation is complying with the philosophies of NPM.  The focus lies on isomorphic 
processes to explain homogeneity of organisational structures within an organisational field (Beckert, 
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1999). DiMaggio and Powell (1991, pp. 64-65) define the ‘organisational field’ as a ‘totality of relevant 
actors’, it is ‘those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organisations that produce 
similar services or products.’ In order to understand the changes that occur within an organisation it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of the external social, economic and political environment within 
which the organisation operates (Kraatz, 1995, 1996; Oliver, 1991). Although the term ‘control’ is rarely 
used explicitly, NIS focuses on the ability of the organisational field to influence or control organisational 
functioning (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) recognise three types of isomorphic change. ‘Coercive 
isomorphism’ as the name implies, is the response to external pressures prompted by other organisations 
on which the organisation relies on and also by societal expectations, either cultural or environmental. 
‘Mimetic isomorphism’ is the act of copying or mimicking other organisations when organisations face 
uncertainty and model themselves on other organisations in order to overcome uncertainty. This mimetic 
behaviour has a conformity element, in that organisations take on contemporary managerial practices to 
justify their genuineness by appearing to be ‘in control’ or ‘at the cutting edge.’ ‘Normative isomorphism’ 
according to DiMaggio and Powell, often occurs within a particular profession operating in organisations. 
Professionals instigate changes which are a direct result of what they believe are accepted modes and rules 
of behaviour. These modes and rules of behaviour have been propagated to the professional through 
teachings and/or through membership of professional societies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence, 
many characteristics of an organisation’s formal structure, procedures and policies illustrate compliance 
with institutionalised rules thereby legitimising it, to foster society’s continued endorsement (for further 
details see Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Covaleski et al., 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). 
Accounting researchers have used NIS theory to explain how external institutions influence 
accounting systems and their associated behaviour (see for example, Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Bealing, 
1994; Berry et al., 1985; Carpenter and Feroz, 1992; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Covaleski et al., 1993; 
Gibbins et al., 1992; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Mezias, 1990; Power, 1992). Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
suggest that management accounting information can play an extensive role throughout the entire 
organisation as it searches for, conforms to, and presents itself in some form of rationality in order to gain 
legitimacy to its external influences. Thus, according to Covaleski et al. (1996, p. 11), not only does 
management accounting represent an objective reality; it may serve as a ‘ceremonial means for 
symbolically demonstrating an organisation’s commitment to a rational course of action.’  
Organisations are constructed through institutionalised practices and historical experiences that 
construct normative models of organisational legitimacy. As changes occur in the institutional rules that 
define legitimacy, organisations respond by voluntarily adopting recommended changes or by giving the 
appearance of having adopted changes in order to appear legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). NIS would suggest that government reforms would prompt organisations of an 
affected field to change, that is, defensive responses to changing notions of what constitutes legitimate 
organisational practice. This is reinforced by DiMaggio and Powell (p. 200) who state, ‘A less common 
but quite dramatic form of institutional change occurs when the boundaries of established fields are 
rearranged. This process can unfold in a geographical fashion or as a result of political upheavals.’ The 
introduction of competition and corporatisation into the Queensland Electricity Supply Industry (QESI) 
and its subsequent restructure, has caused a recomposition of the organisational field.   
Studies from institutional sociology (for example, Fligstein, 1985; Rowan, 1982; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983) show how institutionalising processes in organisational fields engender widespread 
structural conformity across organisations that offer similar products and services. Organisations find 
themselves immersed in a certain cultural and historical context which is portrayed by the existence of 
systems of shared beliefs, symbols and regulation requirements (Scott And Meyer, 1985). The 
organisational activities and designs are more in keeping with these environmental elements (or 
institutional elements) than with technical requirements (Nunez, 2002). That is, organisations give greater 
emphasis to satisfying the environmental requirements of institutional agents than they do to the search for 
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economic efficiency (Nunez, 2002). This view however, is receiving increasing criticism for the lack of 
attention paid to technically rational concepts associated with organisation structures and the interplay 
between both theoretical views. Rational analytical approaches are used primarily for legitimacy 
enhancement (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In providing rational organisational accounts and decisive 
management procedures, an organisation can communicate to others that it accepts the functions of 
economic and technical procedures (Hopwood, 1990).  It can demonstrate organisational legitimacy not 
just as an isomorphic response to an institutionalised field, but as a strategic response to an uncertain 
competitive environment. The performance measurement system and the exercise of efficient 
management, in this instance, become signs of the organisation’s willingness to commit to the public 
sector reform objectives of efficiency and accountability.  
However, in accompaniment with the criticism of NIS for not fully recognising the rational 
analytical purpose of organisational structure, it is also increasingly recognised that rational choice models 
only provide partial explanations for why organisations adopted various management accounting systems. 
As a result, several authors suggest that it may be worthwhile to bridge the gap between what is 
rationalistic and legitimate behaviour by accepting that striving for legitimacy does not necessarily 
conflict with the achievement of economic efficiency through adjustment to competitive pressure and 
other technical prerequisites (Carruthers, 1995; D’Aunno et al., 2000; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; 
Modell, 2002; Powell, 1992).  
The relevance of developing this dual, comprehensive conceptual framework for the study is 
underscored by a further critique of NIS and the more general development of this theoretical perspective 
over the past decades. That is, that early NIS literature has paid relatively one-sided attention to the 
institutionalisation at the macro level by focusing on diffusion patterns. Further, it has tended to focus on 
specific organisational fields, for example, government and the health sector, rather than across a number 
of fields. Hence, a further objective of the study is to provide empirical support for NIS at the micro level 
of organisational change within the electricity supply sector.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As put forward, the primary objective of this research is to explore the institutionalisation of a new PMS, 
namely the BSC in a GOC. To achieve this aim, a single exploratory/descriptive case study with 
embedded multiple unit analysis was used as the research design (Yin, 1984, 1989).  
The organisation studied is an Australian government owned Electricity Corporation in 
Queensland. The organisation distributes electricity related products and services throughout Australia and 
exports energy management and technical consulting services to the Asia-Pacific Rim. The key areas of 
business are electricity retailing, network maintenance, asset management and technical services. The 
Corporation, at the time of the study, owned and operated approximately a $2 billion electricity 
distribution network. Furthermore, the organisation provided power to a population in excess of 2.2 
million. The organisation services one of Australia’s most vigorous growth regions, including six cities 
spread over a 24,830 square-kilometre area. The subject organisation, in order to preserve anonymity, is 
herewith termed PowerCorp.3    
PowerCorp was established under the Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 on 1 January 
1995. However, it was not until 1 July 1997, shortly after the commencement of the study, that the 
PowerCorp was registered under Corporations Law. PowerCorp was successor in law to PowerBoard, the 
Board, established under the Electricity Act on 1 July 1977.  
Interviews were conducted during on site visits at different locations of the organisation, that is, 
branches and depots. The interviewees were selected from the alternative divisions of the organisation, 
that is, Corporate, Network Services, Network, Technical Services, Business Services and Customer 
Services. Within the functional divisions there were various departments which branched into numerous 
smaller groups. In making the selections the researcher made use of the organisation hierarchy. To avoid 
any sampling bias, all managers from the departmental level up were selected4 as it was believed that 
some managers may decide not be involved in the study. Managers were advised that participation was 
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voluntary and should the manager wish to participate, the interview would take between one to two hours. 
Figure 1 presents an illustration of the organisation hierarchy used to determine selection; the number of 
managers representing the relevant levels is also included.  
 
Take in Figure 1 
 
 
During the course of the study, a total of 20 interviews with department managers and 10 
corporate and divisional managers together with the chief executive were interviewed. Fifteen of these 
managers were visited more than once. The additional interview was requested either by the researcher for 
confirmation, or as an express wish by the manager to add additional information. Six group managers 
were also interviewed by their request, often after discussion with their manager (department). Overall, a 
total of 51 interviews were conducted. 
Interview techniques varied from semi-structured, quantitatively oriented to semi-formal guided 
conversations and free-flowing informational exchanges. At the onset of all interviews the objectives were 
clearly defined as well as providing assurance of total confidentiality to the interviewee. Open discussion 
with managers at both levels covered background and demographic issues; knowledge, experience and 
education issues, that is, factual information; culture and behaviour; opinions and values, that is, what the 
manager thought about particular issues; feelings, how did the manager feel; and sensory issues, what had 
the manager heard or sensed in relation to particular issues. For the most part these issues were related to 
areas pertaining to the MCS, public sector reform, corporatisation, NCP, and PMS change. All interviews 
were taped with permission of the interviewee and transcribed word for word and analysed manually at a 
later date. However, at the express request of some interviewees when discussing sensitive information, 
the recorder was turned off until such time that the discussion moved on. This information is not included 
in the study. 
The steps undertaken to analyse the interview data described in this section range from initial 
broad coding to the final stage of thematic coding. During the broad coding stage of the analysis each 
sentence was given a code which represented the topic it discussed. Each of these broad coded sentences 
was then identified as relating to one of a number of themes reflected by the research questions. A further 
coding stage, the causal coding stage, involved examining each transcript and coding the sentences by 
cause, for example, cultural, systems procedure, process, political or general change relating to 
corporatisation or NCP. For example, the use of BSC was primarily driven by corporatisation. This coding 
enabled the linking of sentences to topics, which linked to themes (research questions), and which 
ultimately linked to cause. When writing up the evidence from the study, each of these coded 
classifications were referred to and particularly concise dialogues were quoted to confirm or dispute a 
discussion.  
Field notes of impressions were made directly after interviews so as to capture as Babbie (1989) 
puts forth, all the relevant aspects of the social process. The notes made in the field journal reported 
observations that included physical settings, interview reactions and body language, periods of extended 
silence, and sensitive issues that were discussed without being taped. Reflections on the outcomes of the 
interview were also recorded. 
Document analysis involved investigation of historical records and reports, process and procedure 
manuals, planning documents, costing and budgeting documents, internal news and charts assisted in 
providing a common language by which to confirm and enhance the language of the participants. 
Furthermore, analysis of historical data enabled the researcher to assess meaning through a reconstruction 
of the past.  
The procedure adopted for document analysis remained simple yet effective. Each document was 
examined and filed according to its relevance to a particular topic/theme and subsequently, drawn upon 
whilst writing up that area. Notes made in the field journals from interviews and observations were coded 
similar to that of interview data, however, specific codes were adopted for behaviours which were then 
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linked according to themes and causes. These were drawn on to describe behaviours relevant to different 
topics. 
Although not specifically classified as document analysis in the literature, the researcher was 
given access to some Intranet web sites of the organisation. Many documents, particularly relating to 
current procedures and structures, were no longer held in ‘hard’ copy and were displayed ‘on-line’. 
Subsequently, access was given to review these sites. Relevant information was viewed and printouts or 
notes were taken. 
 
FINDINGS IN THE FIELD 
 
Pre Corporatisation and NCP (1980s Æ 1995) 
Discussions with management regarding the PMS at PowerCorp prior to corporatisation revealed that the 
budget process largely drove the PMS at PowerCorp. It was disclosed that the primary means of 
performance measurement was the use of budget variances for unit costs. These unit cost statistics 
provided some, even if limited, information about performance in that they provided indicators of deviant 
performance which pinpointed areas that required further analysis. This is consistent with Lauth (1985) 
who suggests that, in most cases, performance measures in the public sector are used to support the budget 
process. As such, there was a tendency to focus on workload and efficiency measures rather than 
effectiveness. Table 1 presents some examples of line items that were relevant to variance analysis at 
PowerCorp. 
 
Take in Table 1 
 
 
When aggregated the line items were represented by specific financial indicators, more commonly 
known throughout the organisation as key performance indicators (KPIs). Table 2 lists the financial 
indicators at the organisational level for PowerCorp which were typical of the period prior to 
corporatisation. Monthly reports distributed to divisional heads would also indicate the contribution of 
each of the divisions to the overall result. 
 
Take in Table 2 
 
 
TQM was introduced in the organisation in the mid 1980s. Prior to this, financial indicators were 
the primary means for measuring performance; one manager was quoted as saying:  
 
‘Before the organisation adopted TQM, the performance measurement or KPIs pretty much 
focused on balancing the budget and reliability of the network and supply, that was pretty 
much the business, there wasn't any particular measures on customer satisfaction or any of 
those areas, it was straight financial, balance the books and make sure the system is providing 
the energy. From this time onwards the customer became an issue, price started to become 
important, safety became a big issue and was more effectively measured and managed.’ 
 
TQM and performance measurement are inexorably linked. TQM assumes the need for integrating 
productivity measures, strategic plans, evaluations and communication of results; it renews emphasis on 
defining both the purpose of work activities and the internal and external interrelationships and 
interdependencies of productivity (Nyhan and Marlowe, 1995). At PowerCorp, TQM provided the means 
to vary the types of performance measures used in order to better measure performance and ideally, 
increase effectiveness and efficiency. There were differences however, amongst the individual divisions in 
their use of non-financial performance indicators. These non-financial indicators were supposed to be 
related to the organisation’s eight critical success factors first implemented in 1988. These eight critical 
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success factors were (1) safety, (2) reliability of supply, (3) staff quality and morale, (4) customer service, 
(5) productivity, (6) price, (7) sales/marketing, and (8) corporate image. It was the responsibility of each 
of the divisions to determine the appropriate performance indicators that best suited and achieved the 
organisation’s objectives put forward within the Strategic Plans. However, according to interview 
comments, the measures utilised did not specifically reflect these factors, nor were they consistent 
throughout the organisation. The following comments relay this view: 
 
‘The focus wasn’t there; there really was not a great deal of association between the Plans 
and the KPIs’ (Customer Services, Department Manager). 
 
‘By the time it got down through the organisation the KPIs were not very transparent, in 
some instances they didn’t fit at all’ (Business Services, Department Manager). 
 
‘We had this old style of performance reporting that was set up in the mid 1980s. Eight 
critical success factors, but the KPIs didn’t always match up with any of them’ (Department 
Manager, Technical Services). 
 
 
It is difficult to classify specific KPIs in use at the divisional level given the numerous and diverse 
indicators used throughout the entire organisation. However, the following non-financial performance 
indicators listed in Table 3 provide an indication of the types of measures used; these have been classified 
against the relevant critical success factor. 
 
Take in Table 3 
 
 
Discontent with the disparate measures and their lack of congruency with strategic objectives was 
evidenced through the following comments from departmental managers: 
 
‘Generally the divisions would work out their own KPIs. They would get together and work 
out what measures were most suited to their needs. It didn’t work terribly well, because 
people forgot what they were trying to do in the swamp’ (Network Services). 
 
‘We had a lot of different measures, and I doubt whether they matched any of the other 
divisions. It created a fair bit of confusion when it was time for reporting’ (Network). 
 
‘There was quite a bit of variation throughout the organisation’ (Business Services). 
 
 
In general, most managers argued that what was needed was a methodology that would synthesise 
the positive characteristics of TQM and performance measurement, emphasise participation, 
communication, feedback from employees and customers, complement existing efficiency measures, and 
provide a mechanism for data reduction to compare disparate measures.  
 
Corporatisation and Beyond (1995 Æ) 
The corporatisation of the QESI brought with it a withdrawal of government involvement in the 
management of the GOCs. Shareholding Ministers were to preserve and improve their policy setting role, 
but were to retreat from management activities. However, they were also to reserve their power to 
intervene with directives when situations arose that required political intervention (Coulter, 1993; Halligan 
and Power, 1992). With the expected withdrawal, for the most part, of government intervention came the 
ability to introduce a more innovative PMS, a PMS that was used, at the time, primarily by private sector 
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organisations. As such, in 1995, along with corporatisation, restructure and new strategic postures 
PowerCorp considered the possibility of developing an organising tool for integrating various 
performance criteria in its strategic management process – the Balanced Scorecard.  This was consistent 
with the model put forward by Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996, 2001a, 2001b).  
The scorecard was considered in order to tie more succinctly its strategic planning and objectives 
with performance measures so as to ensure that meeting those objectives was attainable. Institutional 
theories assume that a primary determinant of organisational form is the pressure to conform with a set of 
expectations to gain legitimacy and so secure access to essential resources and continuing survival. A 
usual means of gaining legitimacy is placement with some rationalised institutional myth (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), which is sporadically evident by the adoption of characteristics of form demonstrated by 
other noteworthy organisations through some isomorphic process (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). At 
PowerCorp the BSC was a new innovative PMS that would not only provide proof of legitimate 
behaviour, but also draw together disparate meanings of the organisation. As a result, a management team 
was put together to investigate the feasibility of introducing a BSC at PowerCorp.  
 
BSC and Beyond (1996 Æ) 
Initial investigations, according to one team member, began through research into the then relatively 
‘new’ system. Professionals within the firm advocated the BSC’s ability to achieve economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency, as well as promoting goal congruence. This in turn, provided to external 
constituents, a picture of an organisation conforming to institutionalised rules as well as providing a 
means to improve the organisation’s efficiency, economy and effectiveness. As such, together with the 
introduction of NCP, the first attempt at a BSC was implemented in June 1996, at the organisational level, 
with the eight critical success factors and their indicators condensed into the BSC. Figure 2 presents the 
scorecard implemented in 1996. 
 
Take in Figure 2 
 
 
As is shown by the BSC pictured in Figure 2, performance measures were related to particular 
dimensions. These performance measures had been in use previously but were not specifically related to 
any particular objective. According to team members, the BSC augmented a much clearer direction for 
measuring organisational performance. The introduction of the BSC represented both normative 
isomorphism, through the advocation of professionals, and mimetic isomorphism by mimicking private 
sector systems, in the firm’s attempt to appear legitimate through the adoption of its more focused PMS.  
Brignall and Modell (2000, p. 285) argue ‘the primary motivation for managers’ use of 
performance information is framed in terms of the notion of legitimacy-seeking rather than efficiency 
maximisation.’ In contrast to their view, however, at PowerCorp greater commitment was given by 
managers in developing the more integrated PMS, it is believed that the dissatisfaction of the earlier PMS 
played a significant role in this commitment. As such, a combined legitimacy seeking and rationalistic 
choice was made. Planning workshops at the Divisional and departmental level showed clear evidence of 
participative involvement by managers and staff in the setting of KPIs to specific organisational objectives 
in order to maximise the efficiency of the firm and to correlate with the organisational BSC. A 
performance manager described the process of the workshops: 
 
‘The divisions get together and formulate what is known as an Action Plan report, these are 
the results of the planning workshops. They start with Divisional Plans and these are 
cascaded down and they come up with measures and goals that feed up to the corporate 
objectives’. 
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The workshops focused specifically on setting divisional goals and specific performance measures 
related to achieving those goals. These issues were, according to interview comments, well debated and 
considered at these meetings until there was consensus at the meetings on the results. General comments 
from managers suggested that it created greater commitment to achieving performance goals through the 
participative involvement by management and staff, as the following example from a department manager 
indicates: 
 
‘We became much more involved in the setting of KPIs and subsequently were more willing 
to perform harder as we knew where our jobs fitted in the overall scheme of things, this was 
reinforced by the new bonus scheme introduced as well’ (Technical Services). 
 
 
Towards 1997, feelings were expressed about the expectation of extending the BSC throughout the entire 
organisation, a departure or extension as such, of the organisation’s legitimacy seeking behaviour. The 
organisation considered its strategic position and went further than just adoption at the corporate level by 
implementing the technical rational PMS throughout the entire organisation. Whereas the tool initially was 
developed as a means of linking various types of performance measures to provide a balanced picture of 
the company’s performance, PowerCorp now focused on five perspectives as a framework for integrating 
divisional goals and objectives, strategies, and performance measures across the broad spectrum of 
operations. These five perspectives originated from discussions with consultants who investigated the 
current usage of the BSC. The model that was developed was a five by five matrix that incorporated an 
improvement model from world’s best practice.  
Taking discussions with the consultants on board, PowerCorp realigned the BSC to incorporate 
measures and goals of best practice from the Australian Quality Council (AQC). This approach followed 
the Australian Business Excellence Framework, which, according to one team member, focused on 
quality, whilst the consultant’s framework focused on efficiency, productivity and service level trade off. 
Institutional theorists argue that a driving force behind organisational activities is an organisation’s desire 
to fit with its external environment by conforming to institutional pressures from other organisations 
(Martinez and Dacin, 1999). This isomorphic tendency often leads to mimetic behaviour, uniformity in 
decisions and homogeneity in organisational form. Not only was this demonstrated by PowerCorp through 
its adoption of the BSC at the corporate level but also identified was the strategic choice of adoption 
organisation wide, where the criteria from both frameworks were mapped against the organisation’s own 
strategic direction. Clear objective statements were developed for each of the critical success factors, and 
using both AQC and the consultant’s recommendations, performance measures were identified and 
weighted to track intermediate results and outcomes, respectively. The new divisional BSCs incorporated 
many of the existing performance measures utilised by the alternative divisions with greater attention paid 
to the relationship between the critical success factors. Planning workshops, discussed earlier, greatly 
facilitated the construction of the different divisional BSCs. Figure 3 presents the different BSCs for each 
of the different divisions. 
 
Take in Figure 3 
 
 
PowerCorp’s BSC planning team, implemented and incorporated the BSC plans and measures 
into the firm’s overall performance measurement process; this system was formally named the Business 
Performance Management System (BPMS). Through its BPMS, performance targets and appraisals for 
individuals, groups and teams were tied to the firm’s overall strategic plan.  
Overall, the introduction of a BSC was the organisation’s attempt at drawing together many of the 
useful but disparate measures in place prior to corporatisation. The implementation of the BSC, showed a 
distinct focus on directing the organisation towards commercial practice that mirrored those in the private 
sector demonstrating isomorphic behaviour thereby legitimating the organisation to stakeholders. 
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However, greater salience was also given to relating the KPIs to the critical success factors in order to 
increase the achievement of the related goals. The new focus on commercialism drove many new 
measures to be introduced throughout and how the organisation was managed in terms of performance 
indicating comprehensive technical rational strategic action to remain competitive. A comment by a 
Divisional Executive sums this up: 
 
‘There is no doubt that we have changed the way we drive and manage our staff… It is 
agreed that we have agreed performance targets, many of them commercial. The targets we 
have on our people are driven by our commercial desire to perform’. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The introduction of the BSC at PowerCorp raises interesting issues. Was the new system implemented in 
the first instance to give credence to the organisation direction and goals? Or were they implemented as 
the ‘legitimate’ thing to do given the organisation’s ‘required’ new focus of commercialism?  Or was it 
both? Meyer (1985, p. 120) puts forward the notion that innovations in control systems may simply reflect 
‘fad and fashion in organisational design.’ DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) do acknowledge, 
however, that the earliest adopters of organisational innovations may be driven by a desire to improve 
performance. If NPM is ground in the technical rational paradigm, why is there an argument that NIS does 
not adequately inform organisational and MCS change? NIS would suggest that firms’ adopt technical 
rational procedures for legitimacy. Therefore, adopting technical rational systems may be a result of 
isomorphic behaviour only as put forward by NIS not as a result of strategic decision making. However, if 
this was the case, why would firms’ go to extreme lengths to match PMS with strategy and organisation 
design? Is it merely to legitimate? Or, is it both a method for legitimation and a comprehensive strategic 
technical rational approach?  
Despite the initial separation between technical rational and institutional environments, 
subsequent stages in institutional research have recognised the coexistence of, and correlation between 
both concepts. Hence, technical rational and institutional factors no longer appear as dichotomies (Nunez, 
2002). Although Hussain and Hoque (2002) found no evidence in their study to suggest that management 
have a tendency to copy PMS design, in this study, it is believed that the initial adoption of a BSC was a 
result of isomorphic behaviour and yet, in agreement with their conclusion, in this study the organisation 
specifically designed their BSC to be consistent with the needs and objectives of the organisation. As far 
as PMS is concerned, a combined position of the NIS perspective may lead to a more pragmatic stance, 
seeing the apparent ‘over-proliferation’ of performance indicators and lack of relationship to strategic 
goals as less of a weakness but more as a natural response to the need to provide information to a broad 
range of constituencies (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Feldman and March, 1981; Meyer and Gupta, 1994; 
Modell, 2003). 
The adoption of the BSC in this study is recognised as not only a result of coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphic behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) but also in the organisation’s attempt to 
strategically place itself within the new uncertain competitive environment. The implementation and 
institutionalisation of the system is a direct result of wanting to appear legitimate as well as satisfying 
rational analytical reform criteria of greater economy, effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
 
According to Burns and Scapens (2000), accounting change, which is consistent with the existing routines 
and institutions, will be easier to achieve than change which challenges those rules and institutions. The 
ease with which PowerCorp adopted a BSC approach to performance measurement is a reflection of the 
institutionalised function of the disparate PMS prior to corporatisation. The inducement of both strategic 
management and the new organisation structure at PowerCorp furthered the acceptance of the BSC and 
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provided a vehicle for implementing accountability. It legitimised the organisation and its managerial 
philosophy to external stakeholders and acted as a symbol to members that a new type of commercial 
management had taken hold of the organisation.  
This paper has discussed the findings of a study in an Australian government owned electricity 
supply corporation and provided an explanatory framework grounded in NIS theory for the initial 
adoption of a BSC. The relevance of doing so has been justified through recognition of the technical 
rational nature of decision making and the institutional pressures associated with conforming to 
governmental reforms associated with NPM. Rather than positing institutional and technical rational 
environments as two extremes of a continuum, they were considered as interdependent dimensions. While 
institutional theorists have a tendency to focus on the adaptive nature of organisational behaviour, it was 
found that management are pro-active in the concerns of organisational competitiveness in the new public 
sector and although legitimacy seeking, will endeavour to incorporate components into the design that 
enhance an organisation’s ability to be rational and competitive. The identification of the relationships 
linking the organisation’s technical institutional environments is thus an important step towards closing 
the gap between conventional theoretical explanations of performance management practices and those 
informed by institutional theories. 
 
                                                 
1 The author has direct permission to publish material obtained from the case study 
2 Also termed ‘neo-institutional’ theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
3 All electricity organisations in Queensland were/are Electricity Boards/Corporations distinguished by their regions preceding 
this title, for example, Far North Queensland Electricity Board (FNQEB). To avoid disclosure of the subject organisation, its 
name has been fabricated. All references made to this organisation are completely accurate except for the name(s) applied. 
4 One department manager resided in New Zealand and was excluded. 
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Figure 1: Graphical Presentation of Organisational Hierarchical Structure used to Determine Selection of 
Interviewees. 
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Table 1: Typical Line Items for Budget Variance Analysis at PowerCorp 
• Gross margin 
• Regional income 
• Regional operating expense 
• Regional other income 
• Region depreciation 
• Cash and short-term investments 
• Inventory 
• Debtors 
• Creditors 
• Provisions and other 
• Support services  
• Recoverable works expenditure 
• Customer service expense 
• System operations expense 
• System maintenance expense 
• Electricity sales 
• Electricity purchases 
• Transmission augmentation 
• Distribution augmentation 
• Load energy management 
  
Source: Developed by the Author. 
 
Table 2: Typical Financial Indicators for PowerCorp from the mid 80s to 1994. 
• Billed retail revenue 
• Controllable operating costs 
• Profit before interest and tax (PBIT) 
• Capital expenditure 
• Cash flow 
• Return on fixed assets (ROFA) 
• Return on investment (ROI) 
• Return on equity (ROE) 
• Operating expense  
  
Source: Developed by the author. 
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Table 3: Non-Financial Performance Indicators (typical of the period 1990-1994) 
Critical Success 
Factors 
 
Non-Financial performance Indicators Used 
Safety Lost time injury severity rate 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
Days lost 
 
Reliability of 
Supply 
System minutes lost 
Duration of interruption 
Under Frequency 
Hot water load shed 
voltage complaints 
Cold water complaints 
 
Staff Quality and 
Morale 
Staff levels 
Absenteeism 
Labour turnover 
Training and Development 
 
Customer Service Service orders 
Meter reading error rate 
Supply restoration 
Disconnect for debt 
 
Productivity Customers per full time employee 
GWh sold per full time employee 
Overtime 
Controllable operating cost/KWh 
Monthly load factor 
Average monthly peak demand 
Fleet utilisation 
Stores turnover ratio 
 
Price * 
 
Sales/Marketing Bulk supply energy growth rates 
Energy sales growth – domestic, commercial and industrial and rural 
Customer growth – domestic, commercial, industrial and rural 
 
Corporate Image Community safety 
 
  
Source: Developed by the author. 
*   Electricity price was regulated, distribution price measured solely through budget variances 
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Figure 2: 1996 BSC 
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Figure 3: BSCs for Each Division (a, b, c, d) 
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in SLPA 
Costs to 
Network 
Division 
 
(20%) 
% Network 
Services 
Overheads 
 
 
(10%) 
% 
Corporate 
Overheads 
 
 
 
(10%) 
Billable $ Per 
Production 
Employee 
 
 
(20%) 
% 
Billability 
 
 
 
(20%) 
STRATEGIC 
DIRECTION 
(Growth) 
 
 
(20%) 
$ External 
Revenue – 
Network Services 
vs. budget) 
 
 
(45%) 
% of External 
work attained 
through 
preferred 
supplier 
status 
(45%) 
Market Share of 
PowerCorp 
Business 
 
 
 
(10%) 
   
PROCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
(20%) 
Process 
Management Index 
(100%) 
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c) Technical Services      
STAFF 
 
 
 
 
(20%) 
Technical Services 
LTIFR 
 
 
 
(20%) 
Technical 
Services 
LTISR 
 
 
(20%) 
Technical 
Services 
Employee 
Competency 
Rating 
(20%) 
Technical 
Services 
Culture 
Measure 
 
(20%) 
Workforce 
Availability 
 
 
 
(20%) 
 
CUSTOMER/ 
COMMUNITY 
(incl. Corp. Image) 
 
 
(20%) 
No. of Major Non 
Conformances 
(Environmental 
Compliance) 
 
(30%) 
Maintain Top 
Network 
Division 
Supplier 
Rating 
(35%) 
Meeting or 
Exceeding 
Service Level 
Performance 
Agreements 
(35%) 
   
COMMERCIAL 
 
 
 
 
(20%) 
Technical Services 
EBIT 
------------------ 
Network Services 
Revenue 
(20%) 
% Reduction 
in SLPA 
Costs to 
Network 
Division 
 
(20%) 
% Technical 
Services 
Overheads 
 
 
(10%) 
% Corporate 
Overheads 
 
 
 
(10%) 
Billable $ Per 
Production 
Employee 
 
 
(20%) 
% 
Billability 
 
 
 
(20%) 
STRATEGIC 
DIRECTION 
(Growth) 
 
 
(20%) 
$ External 
Revenue –
Technical Services 
vs. budget) 
 
 
(45%) 
% of External 
work attained 
through 
preferred 
supplier 
status 
(45%) 
Market Share of 
PowerCorp 
Business 
 
 
 
(10%) 
   
PROCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
(20%) 
Process 
Management Index 
(100% 
     
       
  
 
d) Business Services      
STAFF 
 
 
 
(20%) 
Business Services 
LTIFR 
 
 
(20%) 
Business Services 
LTISR 
 
 
(20%) 
Business Services 
Employee 
Competency 
Rating 
 
(20%) 
Business 
Services 
Culture 
Measure 
(20%) 
Workforce 
Availability 
 
 
(20%) 
 
CUSTOMER/ 
COMMUNITY 
(incl. Corp. Image) 
 
(20%) 
Internal Customer 
Satisfaction 
Rating (Service) 
 
(50%) 
Meeting or 
Exceeding Service 
Level Performance 
Agreements 
(50%) 
    
COMMERCIAL 
 
 
(20%) 
Percentage of 
Cost, Performance 
etc, Benchmarks 
Met 
(50%) 
Stock Turnover 
Rate 
 
 
(10%) 
Miscellaneous 
Debtors 
 
(10%) 
% Business 
Services 
Overheads 
(10%) 
% Corporate 
Overheads 
 
(10%) 
 
STRATEGIC 
DIRECTION 
(Growth) 
(20%) 
Leadership in HR 
Policy, Supply, 
Finance & IT 
(100%) 
     
PROCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
(20%) 
Process 
Management 
Index 
(100%) 
     
  
Source: Adapted by the author. 
 
LTIFR – Lost time in frequency rate 
LTISR – Lost time in severity rate 
SAIDI – System Average Interruption Duration Index 
SAIFI – System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
ROFA – Return on fixed assets 
KVA – Measure of transformer capacity (1 MVA = 1000 KVA) Va = t x Amperes 
SLPA – Service level partnering agreement 
 
 
 
